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ABSTRACT
We test conservatism in financial reporting of Vietnamese listed firms over the period of 2005-2014. We find that Vietnamese financial statements 
ensure conservatism’s specifications consisting of asymmetric gain and loss recognition timeliness and asymmetric persistence of earnings changes. 
We further find that the degree of conservatism has increased significantly over the post-crisis economic restructuring period. The findings provide 
empirical evidence to the improved quality of accounting information in Vietnam.
Keywords: Accounting, Accounting Information, Financial Reporting 
JEL Classifications: M40, M48
1. INTRODUCTION
Givoly and Hayn (2000) claim that conservatism is an important 
convention of financial reporting. It implies a caution in the 
recognition and measurement of earnings and assets of a firm. 
Conservatism is considered as an indicator for measuring the 
quality of accounting information. In emerging markets, domestic 
accounting standards are quite different from international 
accounting standards. This leads to foreigner investors’ doubt 
about the quality of accounting information, which is harmful 
to international capital mobilization. Accordingly, developing 
countries are in need of improving the quality of accounting 
information, and Vietnam is no exception in the context of 
the deep international economic integration. To achieve this, 
Vietnamese accounting standards (VASs) have to be adjusted 
to suit international accounting standards. One of the adjusted 
accounting standards is conservatism principle.
When Vietnamese economy integrates deeply into the global 
market, the business market for Vietnamese firms is an 
intercontinental market. Consequently, the barriers to the 
integration are necessary to be mitigated gradually, and the 
accounting information hurdle is too. Vietnam has done much 
preparation for the international economic integration. The 
Minister of Finance promulgated Decision 15/2006/QĐ-BTC 
dated March 20, 2006 on issuing Vietnamese enterprise accounting 
system based on international accounting standards1. Vietnam 
has been a member of Asian-Oceanian Standard-Setters Group 
(AOSSG) since 20112. The purpose of the participation is to get 
the consultation from AOSSG in the process of setting up and 
adjusting Vietnam accounting standards to suit international 
accounting standards. As a result, circulation 200/2014/TT-BTC 
dated December 22, 20143 on guidelines for accounting policies 
1 However, the difference between Vietnamese accounting standards and 
international accounting standards has been still rather large. In 2010, 
Virginia Foote, President of the US-Vietnam Trade Council, complained 
that Vietnamese accounting regime is too peculiar to understand and 
therefore unreliable.
2 The report on AOSSG’s activities in 2011.
3 The circulation replaces decision No. 15/2006/QD-BTC dated March 20, 
2006.
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for enterprises was issued to lay the basis for the roadmap for the 
convergence of VASs with international accounting standards 
from 2016. With the increased reform of Vietnamese accounting 
system, to the extent that we expect conservatism to be ensured 
gradually in Vietnamese financial statements.
On the other hand, Ball et al. (2003) find that although accounting 
standards of emerging markets such as Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thai Lan are mostly based on international accounting standards, 
conservatism is not warranted. They attribute the cause of the 
phenomenon to influence of family control, “insider” networks 
and government codification and income taxation on financial 
reporting practices. Because Vietnam also has the same features, 
conservatism is unlikely to be exercised in Vietnamese financial 
statements.
For the above-mentioned reasons, we question whether 
conservatism is ensured in Vietnamese financial statements. 
Following Basu (1997), we test conservatism’s specifications 
including asymmetric news recognition timeliness and asymmetric 
persistence of earnings changes. The results are consistent with 
Basu (1997). We contend that conservatism is warranted in 
financial reporting practices. Next, we examine the change in 
conservatism over time. We find that Vietnamese firms have 
complied with conservatism since the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
This paper gives empirical evidence on the improved quality of 
accounting information in Vietnam.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses 
the nature of conservatism and introduces its measurement. 
Section 3 explains research design. Section 4 describes sample 
selection procedures and empirical results and conclusions are 
reached in Section 5.
2. MEASUREMENT OF CONSERVATISM
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB, 1980) states 
conservatism as a prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure 
that uncertainty and risks inherent in business situations are 
adequately considered. Vietnam Accounting Standards (MOF, 
2002) defines conservatism as necessary consideration, caution 
and assessment are exercised to do accounting estimations under 
uncertain conditions. However, these definitions are improbable 
to offer a test method in empirical research. Basu (1997) gives 
an unambiguous description of conservatism as denoting the 
accountants’ tendency to require a higher degree of verification 
to recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as 
losses. Following Basu (1997), Watts (2003) calls conservatism 
as the asymmetrical verification requirements for gains and losses. 
The interpretation is consistent with that of Vietnam Accounting 
Standards. It dictates that revenue and income are only recognized 
as there is enough solid evidence on the obtained economic 
benefits, whereas all probable expenditures are captured when 
they are incurred. For instance, setting aside provisions in financial 
reporting is one of the typical examples of conservatism.
In the spite of the fact that the definitions of conservatism and its 
reasons have been still on debate, Basu’s definition (1997) and 
Watt’s explanations (2003) lay the foundations for the development 
of conservatism research (Ball et al., 2003; Pae, 2007; Francis 
et al., 2013). In order to test conservatism, Basu (1997) suggests 
the two properties of conservatism. They are asymmetric news 
recognition timeliness and asymmetric persistence of earnings 
changes. Asymmetric news recognition timeliness is attributable 
to accountants’ tendency to recognize bad news timelier than 
good news into earnings. For instance, unrealized losses will be 
recognized more instantly than unrealized gains. Furthermore, 
because economic information is reflected in stock prices (Ball 
and Brown, 1968; Beaver et al., 1980; Kothari and Sloan, 1992), 
Basu (1997) uses firm-level stock return to measure economic 
news. Negative returns and positive returns are proxies for bad 
news and good news, respectively.
Basu (1997) finds that asymmetric news recognition timeliness 
results into asymmetric persistence of earnings changes. In 
particular, nearly all bad news is captured immediately, whereas 
good news recognition is conducted partly or postponed to future 
periods. The deferment of good news recognition leads to the 
higher persistence of earnings in good news periods than that in 
bad news periods. In turn, the asymmetric persistence of earnings 
changes results in the greater tendency of the reversal of bad 
news earnings changes than that of good news earnings changes. 
In other words, firms with poor performance in prior year are 
inclined to reverse than firms with good performance in prior year 
on asymmetrically timely loss recognition basis.
Following Basu’s specifications of conservatism (1997), we 
investigate conservatism in Vietnamese financial statements.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1. Measurement of Asymmetric News Recognition 
Timeliness
The timeliness of earnings in response to stock returns (economic 
news) is expressed by the pooled cross-sectional regression 
of beginning-of-fiscal-year price deflated accounting earnings 
(Eit/Pt-1) on concurrent stock returns (Rit):
E
P
Rit
it
it it
−
= + +
1
0 0α β ε
 (1)
In regression (1), the slope coefficient on stock returns (β0), 
measuring the sensitivity of earnings to stock returns, is expected 
to be positive. This implies that economic news navigates 
the timeliness of earnings. In addition, we regress separately 
earnings on negative stock returns (“bad news”) and on positive 
stock returns “good news.” Earnings are predicted to be timelier 
in recognizing “bad news” than “good news;” therefore, R2 
(Adjusted R2) of regression (1) for “bad news” (Rit<0) sample is 
expected to be higher than that for “good news” (Rit≥0) sample.
The asymmetric timeliness of earnings in respect of stock 
returns is alternatively inferred from the pooled cross-sectional 
regression of beginning-of-fiscal-year price deflated accounting 
earnings on concurrent stock return with dummy variable (Dit), 
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which equals one for negative stock returns (“bad news”), zero 
otherwise:
E
P
D R R Dit
it
it it it it it
−
= + + + +
1
0 1 0 1α α β β ε
 (2)
In regression (2), the slope coefficients on stock returns, β
0 
and 
(β
0
+β
1
), serve as the measures of the sensitivity of earnings to 
positive stock returns and negative stock returns, respectively. 
The interactive slope coefficient (β
1
) measures the difference in 
the sensitivity of earnings to negative stock returns and positive 
stock returns. They are expected to be positive. This indicates 
that the timeliness of earnings is asymmetrically greater for “bad 
news” than for “good news”. The relative sensitivity of earnings 
with “bad news” compared to “good news” is measured by the 
ratio of the slope coefficient on negative stock returns to that on 
positive stock returns [(β
0
+β
1
)/β
0
].
3.2. Measurement of Asymmetric Persistence of 
Earnings Changes
The persistence of earnings changes is tested by the pooled cross-
sectional regression of beginning-of-fiscal-year price deflated 
earnings change (∆Eit/Pit-1) on prior earnings change (∆Eit-1/Pit-2):
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In regression (3), the slope coefficient on preceding earnings 
change (β0) is predicted to be negative, which indicates the 
reversal of earnings changes. In particular, an increase (decrease) 
in previous earnings results in a decrease (increase) in current 
earnings. This implies the persistence of earnings changes. For the 
purpose of testing asymmetrically persistent earnings changes, we 
run regression (3) separately with negative prior earnings change 
(“bad news” period) and positive prior earnings change (“good 
news” period) in succession. R2 of the regression for “bad news” 
period sample (∆Eit-1/Pit-2<0) is predicted to be higher than that of 
the repression for “good news” period (∆Eit-1/Pit-2≥0).
Alternatively, the asymmetric persistence of earnings changes is 
tested by the pooled cross-sectional recognition of beginning-of-
fiscal-year price deflated earnings change on prior earnings change 
with dummy variable (Dit), which equals one for negative prior 
earning change (“bad news”), zero otherwise:
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In regression (4), the slope coefficients on prior earnings change, β
0 
and (β
0
+β
1
), measure the reversal of “good news” earnings changes 
and “bad news” earnings changes, respectively. The earnings 
changes reverse completely in the following period if the slope 
coefficients equal minus one. The interactive slope coefficient (β
1
) 
measures the difference in the reversal of “bad news” earnings 
changes and “good news” earnings changes. These coefficients 
are predicted to be negative, which shows that the reversal of 
“bad news” period is asymmetrically greater than that of “good 
news” period. Differently phrased, earnings changes would be 
less persistent for bad news than good news.
4. DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1. Data
The sample is obtained from non-financial firms listed on 
Hochiminh stock exchange and Hanoi stock exchange over 
the period from 2005 to 2014. Earnings and stock returns, 
measured per share, are deflated by beginning-of-fiscal-year 
stock price to control heteroskedasticity (Christie, 1987). In 
addition, we use White-Huber standard errors to compute 
t-statistic, called heteroskedasitcity-robust t-statistic (White, 
1980). Holding-period stock returns are computed to end three 
months after the fiscal year-end to exclude the market reaction 
to the prior year’s earnings. Market-adjusted variables are used 
as alternatives for the regressions to control non-stationarity. 
We rule out observations falling in the top or bottom 1% of 
beginning-of-fiscal-year deflated earnings and stock returns to 
avoid potential influences of outliers on regression results. The 
change in observations corresponding requirements of each test 
is described in each table.
4.2. Asymmetric News Recognition Timeliness
Table 1 reports regression results of earnings on stock returns. 
In Panel A, the results of regression (1) in row (1) shows that 
R2 (19.87%) is fairly higher than that of the studies of Lev (1989) 
and Basu (1997). Consistent with Basu (1997), the estimated slope 
coefficient of 0.108 on stock returns is significantly positive at the 
1% level, which implies that economic news affects accounting 
earnings. Row (2) and row (3) display the results of separate 
regressions (1) on positive return sample and negative return 
sample. R-squared of the negative return sample of 12.17% 
is higher than that of the positive return sample (4.98%). It 
indicates that earnings are more sensitive to bad news than good 
news. Row (4) reports the results of regression (2). The slope 
coefficients on R and (R x D) are 0.064 and 0.172 respectively, 
which are significant at 1% level. The sensitivity of earnings to 
“bad news” is 3.68 ([0,172+0,064]/0,064) times as much as that 
to good news. The result confirms “bad news” recognition into 
earnings on a timelier basis.
For time-series stationarity control, regression (1) and (2) are run 
with market-adjusted variables. The results shown in Panel B are 
completely consistent with those displayed in Panel A. These 
results strongly justify asymmetric news recognition timeliness 
specification of conservatism4.
4.3. Asymmetric Persistence of Earnings Changes
Table 2 replicates Basu’s regression of beginning-of-fiscal 
deflated earning changes on prior beginning-of-fiscal deflated 
earnings changes. In Panel A, the results of regression (3) 
in row (1) are consistent with Basu (1997). The tendency of 
earnings change reversal in the next period is tested with the 
slope coefficient of −0.211, which is significantly negative at 
4 We test asymmetric news recognition timeliness for Hanoi stock exchange 
and Hochiminh stock exchange separately and achieve the same results.
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Table 1: Asymmetric news recognition timeliness
Regression (1): Eit/Pit-1 = α0 + β0Rit
(+)
Regression (2): Eit/Pit-1=α0+α1Dit+β0Rit+β1RitDit
(+) (+)
Panel A: Regression of earnings on returnsa
Sample α0 α1 β0 β1 Adjusted R2 (%)
(1) 0.099
(36.67)***
0.108
(20.94)***
19.87
(2) Rit≥0
921 obs
0.131
(19.96)***
0.064
(7.77)***
4.98
(3) Rit<0
1,187 obs
0.136
(18.95)***
0.236
(11.76)***
12.17
(4) 0.131
(19.96)***
0.006
(0.52)
0.064
(7.77)***
0.172
(7.91)***
22.42
Panel B: Regression of market-based earnings on market-based returnsb
(1) 0.0006
(0.23)
0.128
(16.66)***
15.97
(2) Rit≥0
1,120 obs
0.027
(5.11)***
0.077
(6.96)***
4.88
(3) Rit<0
989 obs
0.021
(3.91)***
0.25
(9.74)***
10.32
(4) 0.027
(5.11)***
−0.006
(−0.77)
0.077
(6.96)***
0.173
(6.18)***
18.19
Eit is earnings per share for firm i at year t, Pit-1 is stock price per share of the beginning day of fiscal year t. 
aRit is stock return for firm i over the period from 9 months before fiscal 
year-end t to three months after fiscal year-end t, Dit is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if Rit<0, =0 otherwise. The full sample consists of 2,108 observations from 2005 to 2014. 
bEit/Pit-1 is 
the EP ratio less the average Et/Pt-1 in year t, Rit is adjusted by market return in the same fashion. The dummy variable is redefined to match the adjustment of Rit. The tests are conducted 
on 2,109 observations from 2005 to 2014. ***Significant at 1% level. Heteroskedascity-robust t-statistic is indicated in parentheses below estimated coefficients
Table 2: Alternative specification of conservatism: Asymmetric persistence of earnings changes
Regression (3): ∆Eit/Pit-1=α0+β0∆Eit-1/Pit-2
(−)
Regression (4): ∆Eit/Pit-1=α0+α1Dit+β0∆Eit-1/Pit-2+β1Dit∆Eit-1/Pit-2
(−) (−)
Panel A: Regression of beginning‑of‑fiscal‑year deflated earnings changes on prior earning beginning‑of‑fiscal‑year deflated earnings 
changesa
Sample α0 α1 β0 β1 Adjusted R
2 (%)
(1) −0.006
(−1.1)
−0.211
(−3.88)***
3.06
(2) ∆Eit-1/Pit-2≥0
955 obs
−0.01
(−1.27)
(−0.045)
(−0.98)
0.012
(3) ∆Eit-1/Pit-2<0
1,198 obs
−0.046
(−4.81)***
−0.507
(−4.94)***
8.68
(4) −0.01
(−1.27)
−0.037
(−3)***
−0.045
(−0.98)
−0.463
(−4.11)***
6.2
Alternate Regression (3): ∆Eit/Pit-1=α0+β0Eit-1/Pit-2
(−)
Alternate Regression (4): ∆Eit/Pit-1=α0+α1D+β0Eit-1/Pit-2+β1DEit-1/Pit-2
(−) (−)
Panel B: Regression of beginning‑of‑fiscal‑year deflated earnings on prior earning beginning‑of‑fiscal‑year deflated earningsb
(1) 0.05
(7.70)***
−0.498
(−17.86)***
12.69
(2) Eit-1/Pit-2≥0
2,028 obs
−0.011
(−1.62)
−0.108
(−3.71)***
0.48
(3) Eit-1/Pit-2<0
161 obs
0.056
(0.95)
−0.743
(−5.21)***
16.34
(4) −0.011
(−1.62)
0.067
(1.14)
−0.108
(−3.71)***
−0.636
(−4.39)***
17.07
Eit is earnings per share for firm i at fiscal year t, ∆Eij is earnings change from year j-1 to year j. Pit-j is the closing price at the end of fiscal year t-j. 
aDit=1 if ∆Eit-1/Pit-2<0 and=0 otherwise. 
There are 2,153 observations over the period from 2005 to 2014. bDit=1 if Eit-1/Pit-2<0 and=0 otherwise. There are 2,189 over the period from 2005 to 2014. ***Significant at 1% level. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistic is indicated in parentheses below the estimated coefficients
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the 1% level. Row (2) and row (3) show the results of regression 
(3) conducted separately on the two samples. The adjusted R2 
of negative previous earnings change sample (8.68%) is much 
higher than that of positive previous earnings sample (0.012%), 
which is consistent with the greater tendency for “bad news” 
earnings change reversal than “good news” earnings change 
reversal. Row (4) reports the results of regression (4). The 
slope coefficient on positive preceding earnings changes of 
−0.045 is insignificantly negative. It is consistent with lasting 
“good news” recognition in earnings. The slope coefficient on 
negative earnings changes of −0.508 [(−0.045)+(−0.463)] is 
significantly different from zero and minus one at the 1% level5. 
The estimated slope coefficient for the difference in the reversal 
of negative preceding earnings changes and that of positive 
preceding earnings changes is −0.463, which is significant at 
the 1% level. These results are consistent with earning changes 
being less persistent for earnings decreases (“bad news”) than 
earnings increases (“good news”).
To provide more confidence about asymmetric persistence of 
earnings changes, we conduct regression (3) and (4) of beginning-
of-fiscal-year deflated earnings changes on beginning-of-fiscal-
year deflated earnings. The results shown in Panel B are primarily 
consistent with those shown in Panel A. These results support 
asymmetric persistence of earnings changes specification, an 
alternate measure of conservatism6.
In sum, the tests give empirical evidence on conservatism in 
Vietnamese financial statements. We examine next conservatism 
over time in the context of the increased international economic 
integration.
4.4. Conservatism Over Time
We conduct regression (2) in Panel B of Table 1 for each year 
to obtain the slope coefficients on “good” and “bad” news, β0 
and (β0+β1) respectively. These annual coefficients are plotted 
in Figure 1 over the period from 2005 to 2014. There is no 
difference in the slope coefficients in the years prior to the 
2007-2008 financial crash. It suggests that conservatism is 
not exercised in the beginning period of the deep international 
economic integration7. Except for 2010 and 2013, the gap 
between the two coefficients has been widening since 2008. The 
tendency indicates that the sensitivity of earnings to bad news 
has been increasingly higher than that to good news. In other 
words, conservatism has improved since the crisis. In 2010, 
5 H
0
:β0+β1=0 is rejected in favor of H1:β0+β1≠0, F statistic equals 24.35; 
H
0
: β0+β1= −1 is rejected in favor of H1: β0+β1≠−1, F statistic equals 22.95.
6 We test asymmetric persistence of earnings changes for Hanoi stock 
exchange and Hochiminh stock exchange separately and achieve the same 
results.
7 The book titled “Globalization and Development Volume II: Country 
Experiences” (edited by Shigeru Thomas Otsubo) reads “Trade liberation 
was largely conducted on a unilateral basis in the 1990s, but it was 
accelerated in the 2000s under regional trading agreements and during 
Vietnam’s accession to the WTO. In 2007, the acquisition of WTO 
membership after more than 10 years of preparation and negotiation 
marked a turning point in Vietnam’s international economic integration” 
(2016, p. 153).
Vietnamese firms found it difficult to obtain external funding via 
credit institutions because of the Circular 13/2010/TT-NHNN 
stipulating prudential ratios in operations of credit institutions. 
Instead, they funded their growth through equity financing. 
This leads to a boom in the issuance of additional shares8. In 
2013, Vietnamese stock market strongly recovered; therefore, 
Vietnamese firms seized this opportunity to mobilize capital 
through the stock market9. To the extent that Vietnamese firms 
were likely to decorate financial statements to attract investors 
and hence not conform to conservatism principle in financial 
reporting.
Evidently, the accounting information of Vietnamese financial 
statements has improved since 2008. Following Ball and his 
fellow researchers’ stance (2003), we suggest that the adoption 
of international accounting standards into domestic accounting 
standards and the post-crisis economic restructuring policies 
influence financial statements preparers’ incentives effectively. 
This drives them to abide by conservatism in financial reporting 
practices and enrich the quality of accounting information.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper tests conservatism in financial statements of 
Vietnamese listed firms over the period from 2005 to 2014. 
The results are consistent with Basu (1997). Accordingly, 
conservatism’s specifications including asymmetric news 
recognition timeliness and asymmetric persistence of earnings 
changes are statistically significant; therefore, we have 
empirical evidence to suggest that Vietnamese firms exercise 
conservatism in financial reporting. In addition, we also realize 
that conservatism has been warranted increasingly since the 
financial crunch. The results implies that the adoption of 
international accounting standards into VASs and the post-crisis 
economic restructuring policies have made a positive impact on 
improving the quality of accounting information in the context 
of international economic integration.
8 The State Securities Commission this year has approved the largest ever 
number of share offerings by listed firms. The amount of mobilized capital 
in 2010 was three times as much as that in 2009.
9 In 2013, market capitalization to gross domestic product ratio was about 
31%. The amount of raised capital through private placement in 2013 was 
five times as large as that in 2012.
Figure 1: Slope coefficients of market-adjusted earnings on positive 
and negative market-adjusted returns from 2005 to 2014
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